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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The need to balance developmental and environmental issues globally 
has become acute due to the issue of climate change.  As negotiations on 
the future of the international climate regime languish and countries have 
difficulties agreeing on a balance, international law, and specifically 
international dispute resolution, may be able to provide some guidance.  
According to international environmental law, states have a responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states, or to areas beyond the limits 
of their national jurisdiction.1  This principle was applied in a 1935 
arbitration2 to find a balance between cross border pollution damage in 
one country and industrial development rights in another.  More recently 
in 1997, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,3 though obiter dicta, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed the principle but found 
that the environmental damage claimed by Hungary did not rise to the 
level of a peremptory norm to act as a defense to terminate the contractual 
agreements to build a hydroelectric power system under the treaty between 
Hungary and Slovakia.4 
The diffuse nature of climate change sources and damage, difficulties 
in establishing cause and effect, and procedural barriers to international 
jurisdiction5 make it unlikely that traditional international law courts, 
 1. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5–16, 1972, princ. 21, Declaration of the United Nations on the Human 
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].   
This principle of Roman law, also known as the no-harm rule, is incorporated into 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 2. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963, 1965 (1935) 
(Int’l Joint Comm’n 1941).  The International Joint Commission, after finding Canada 
liable, initially found $350,000 in damages, id. at 1918, then found an additional $78,000 
in damages, id. at 1933, and imposed a management and regulatory scheme to monitor 
and enforce compliance, id. at 1966. 
 3. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
41–42 (Sept. 25) (citing Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241–42 (July 8)). 
 4. The Court considered that “such ground for precluding wrongfulness can only 
be accepted on an exceptional basis” and that “the state of necessity can only be invoked 
under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied.” Id. at 40. 
 5. One of the greatest barriers to use of the International Court of Justice is non-
submission to its jurisdiction by the US and China, the largest energy users and GHG 
emitters and potentially the most vulnerable defendants. A list of the countries that have 
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such as the ICJ, will be providing such balancing for climate change 
issues in the near future.  However, the obligations that most countries 
have taken on in the climate change regime require adoption of national 
energy policies that have significant impacts on international trade.  
Because of this, climate change disputes are arising at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Historically, the WTO dispute resolution system 
provided a system for balancing contractual rights and obligations in 
international trade.6  However, through the evolution of its purpose7 and 
decisions on the compatibility of national environmental measures and 
international trade law, it appears that the WTO dispute settlement body 
has attempted to find ways to balance trade and environmental rights and 
obligations affecting its members8 While this may lead us to assume that 
decisions of WTO environmental jurisprudence are consistent in cases 
with similar facts, the principles of stare decisis and precedent are not 
principles of international law9 and as a result, there is still room for 
inconsistent decisions at the WTO which may have effects on states’ 
policies, obligations and rights. 
This article, therefore, draws attention to the different outcomes that 
may result when WTO law is applied to resolve climate related national 
energy policy disputes, signals this might send for national energy policies, 
submitted the compulsory commission of the ICJ can be found on its website.  Int’l 
Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 18, 
2012). 
 6. According to its preamble, the purpose of the GATT 1947, the precursor of the 
WTO 1994, was the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
 7. The purpose is reflected in the context of the preambles of GATT 1947 as, 
“[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living . . . developing the full use of the resources of the world 
and expanding the production and exchange of goods.” GATT, supra note 6, pmbl.  In 
contrast, the preambular context of the Marrakesh Agreement states the purpose as: 
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living . . . expanding the production of and 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment . . . 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 8. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl. 
 9. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 
2 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT No. 1, at 5, 14 (2011). 
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and how a subtle effect of indirect state liability may arise.  Several 
pending or unresolved complaints currently at the WTO are used to 
demonstrate these effects.  The complaints include the greenhouse gas 
controversy,10 the wind energy subsidies complaint,11 and the feed-in 
tariffs complaint.12  The next section, Section II, presents the basic WTO 
obligations of the four countries involved in these complaints (Japan, 
Canada, USA, China), and ways that state liability can theoretically arise.  
Section III explains, with some example cases, how the consistency of 
national environmental policies with WTO laws has previously been 
decided.  Section IV explains the main energy-related obligations of the 
countries under the international climate change regime. Section V 
discusses those unresolved complaints in light of the countries’ WTO 
and climate regime obligations.  Finally, the article concludes by 
demonstrating that the WTO not only has the power to change the 
direction of countries’ energy policies, but its decisions may also lead to 
indirect state liability. 
It should be noted that this paper is not about the compatibility of 
national energy policies with WTO law per se.  Therefore there is no 
exhaustive discussion of all analogous environmental compatibility 
cases.  Select cases are discussed only as indicators of WTO’s potential  
to change national (energy) policies as well as to lead to a subtle and 
indirect effect on state liability. 
II.  TRADE, ENERGY AND THE WTO 
Global GDP growth is closely related to growth in energy (mainly oil) 
production (Figure 1a).13  The percentage of global GDP associated with 
global trade, including both imports and exports, has risen from less than 
20% in the 1960s to more than 40% after 2000 (Figure 1b).14 
  
 10. See infra p. 216. 
 11. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures 
Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http:// 
www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds419-1(cr).pdf. 
 12. See Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting 
the Renewable Energy Sector, WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http:// www. 
worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds412-1(cr).pdf [hereinafter Feed-in Tariffs Request for Consultations]. 
 13. See Gail Tverberg, Oil and the Economy: Why it is Important to Figure Out 
Approximately Where We Are Headed, ENERGY BULLETIN, fig.4 (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2010-12-02/oil-and-economy-why-it-important-
figure-out-approximately-where-we-are-headed. 
 14. See Merchandise Trade (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, available at http:// 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries?display=graph (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2011). 
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  (a) (b) 
Figure 1: (a) Relationship between world GDP growth and growth in 
energy production; (b) Global merchandise trade (imports and exports) as 
percentage of global GDP. 
After a dip during the recession years of 2008-2009, a continued increase in 
this trade relationship may be expected.15  This expansion in global trade 
itself raises many energy and climate related questions not discussed 
here.  One such question is how trade in environmental goods should be 
liberalized,16 an issue that fits into the original framework of the pre-
WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was 
aimed towards the liberalization of global trade according to mutually 
agreed contractual rules.17  This was to be accomplished by “ . . . developing 
the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production 
and exchange of goods . . . ”18  The later development of GATT under the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO in 1994, states that standards of living 
 15. This assumption is based on historical rates of GDP growth shown in Figure 
1(b), as well as future expected growth in advanced economies, such as China.  See 
World Econ. Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND, 1, 2 tbl.1.1, 10 (April 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
weo/2012/01/index.htm. 
 16. Discussions are on-going on the liberalization of trade in environmental goods 
and services within the Doha Round.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 31(iii), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M 746 (2002) 
[hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/  
min01_e/ mindecl_e.pdf. 
 17. See GATT, supra note 6, pmbl. 
 18. Id. 
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should be raised through the production of, and trade in, goods and 
services “ . . . while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment . . . ”19  With this change toward 
recognition of the importance of the environment, the WTO has become 
more than a venue for mere trade liberalization.  The WTO’s rules now 
deeply affect any member state regulatory structure as to the trade of 
goods, financial services, subsidies, and agriculture.20  There may also be 
effects on domestic public health standards, conservation, the environment 
and national development agendas.21  As national energy policies can 
permit, restrict or enhance various types of carbon intense goods, as well 
as the trade of those goods,22 world trade can thus have a large impact on 
national energy and climate policies as well as greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. 
A.  WTO Provisions Relevant to the Environment and by                      
Extension to Climate Change 
Relevant to this article, the most important multilateral trade agreements 
under the Agreement Establishing the WTO are the GATT, the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),23 and the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement (SCM).24  The members of the WTO have agreed 
to the basic obligation of non-discrimination among equal partners, 
expressed either as the most-favored-nation principle (MFN),25 or as the 
national treatment principle.26  The non-discrimination principles are 
expressed differently in each agreement, but the MFN principle basically 
 19. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, pmbl. 
 20. A study on the effects of WTO accession on policies and reforms in transition 
countries that have recently joined the WTO illustrates the issues. See Marc Bacchetta & 
Zdenek Drabek, Effects of WTO Accession on Policy-making in Sovereign States: 
Preliminary Lessons from the Recent Experience of Transition Countries 12 (WTO, Org. 
Dev. and Econ. Research Div., Staff Working Paper No. DERD-2002-02, Apr. 2002), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/derd200202_e.htm. 
 21. See infra pp. 207–09 (exemplifying how countries may have to defend their 
environmental policies). 
 22. For example, Japan’s national energy policy, which requires the most energy 
efficient standards for goods in a class of goods, can act to restrict the import of the same 
type of goods that are less energy efficient.  See infra pp. 217–19. 
 23. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter 
TBT]. 
 24. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM]. 
 25. GATT, supra note 6, art. I 
 26. Id. art. III. 
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requires all trade concessions for a good given by state A, to an 
equivalent good from state B, to be given immediately and unconditionally 
to all WTO member states.27 
National treatment means equal treatment between domestic and 
imported like products with respect to taxes, charges, laws, regulations, 
and requirements.28  There is a positive requirement to “accord treatment 
no less than that accorded like products of national origin,”29 and a 
negative requirement to not afford “protection to domestic production.”30  
There is also a requirement to provide equality of competitive conditions 
for imported products in relation to domestic products.31 
The TBT further defines GATT Article III, subdivision (4), on the 
“laws, regulations and requirements affecting [the] internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use [of products].”32  
An example of a regulation that may act as a barrier to trade is a technical 
standards barrier.33  Harmonizing this principle into international technical 
standards is encouraged, and would be important to improve the efficiency 
of production and facilitate international trade.34  Where international 
standards exist, and few do,35 members must use them.36  National technical 
regulations that meet certain conditions will be rebuttably presumed 
consistent with this obligation.37  A national regulation with a significant 
effect on international trade must be notified and published.38 
 27. Id. art. I, ¶ 1. 
 28. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 97, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report, Asbestos Measures]. 
 29. GATT, supra note 6, art. III, ¶ 2. 
 30. Id. art. III, ¶ 3(b). 
 31. Appellate Body Report, Asbestos Measures, supra note 28, ¶ 97. 
 32. GATT, supra note 6, art. III, ¶ 2. 
 33. Japan’s Top Runner Program, adopted under its 1979 Law for Rational Use of 
Energy, is a good example of a technical barrier to trade.  See infra pp. 217–19. 
 34. See TBT, supra note 23, pmbl. 
 35. See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Codex Alimentarius (2011), http://www. 
codexalimentarius.org/standards/en/.  The Codex Alimentarius is one such codification 
for food safety standards that is recognized by the WTO as an international standard in 
the context of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  See 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Annex A, ¶ 3(a), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS]. 
 36. See TBT, supra note 23, art. 2.4. 
 37. Id. art. 2.5. 
 38. Id. arts. 2.9.1–2.9.2. 
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Subsidies are a major policy instrument used by governments to promote 
clean energy development.39  In the SCM a subsidy is defined as a 
contribution by a government or a public body that also provides a 
benefit and meets all the following criteria: (a) is direct, such as grants, 
loans, or equity infusion, or potentially direct, such as loan guarantees, 
or a liability such as a loan or guarantee;40 (b) is revenue foregone for 
the government, for example, tax credits;41 (c) is a government 
provision or purchase of goods or services other than infrastructure; 
and (d) the benefit must be considered to be income or price support.42 
Under the SCM, a subsidy can be prohibited, actionable, or non-
actionable, and prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies must be 
shown to be specific to an enterprise or group of enterprises.43  A 
prohibited subsidy is either contingent upon export performance or upon 
the use of domestic versus imported goods.44  On the other hand, 
actionable subsidies are those that either cause adverse effects to the 
interests of other parties, or cause injury to the domestic industry, or nullify 
or impair benefits conferred by tariff concessions, or cause serious prejudice 
to party interests.45  Serious prejudice includes such effects as increasing 
the world market share of the allegedly subsidized product as compared 
to the average share it had in the previous 3 years.46 
Whether national environmental regulations are allowed to stand 
under the WTO depends to a large extent on the interpretation of the 
exceptions permitted in each agreement.  Thus GATT Article XX states 
that as long as national measures “ . . . are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
reaction on international trade, nothing in this agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, or . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”47 
 39. See U.N. ENV’T. PROGRAMME, DIV. OF TECH., INDUS. AND ECON., REFORMING 
ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTUNITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA, 
at 19, U.N. Sales No. 10.III.D.18 (2010). 
 40. See SCM, supra note 24, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i). 
 41. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) 
 42. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2). 
 43. See SCM, supra note 24, arts. 2.1, 3–9. 
 44. Id. art. 3.1. 
 45. See id. art. 5. 
 46. Id. art. 6.3(d). 
 47. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX, ¶ I(b), (g). 
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The national treatment exception is expressed differently in the TBT, 
that technical regulations “ . . . are not prepared, adopted or applied with 
a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade” and “ . . . shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective . . . ”48  Legitimate objectives 
include the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment.49  In either agreement the underlying 
principle when permitting national environmental regulations is to not 
discriminate or create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
There is no provision for environmental exceptions in the SCM.50  
Whether subsidies are allowed to stand that protect the environment or 
conserve resources when not more trade restrictive than necessary, is the 
subject only of academic discussion.51  One author has suggested that 
actionable subsidies can be subject to a GATT Article XX-type analysis.52  
If so, provided the subsidy is related to environmental protection, is 
necessary to protect humans and the environment and is applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, such actionable subsidies may be consistent with 
WTO law. 
It is relevant to note that the primary objective of a dispute settlement 
ruling is to bring the inconsistent measure into conformance with the 
relevant agreement.53  If this is impracticable, the temporary remedy of 
compensation can be given.54  The WTO next provides for suspension of 
concessions, also known as countermeasures, proportional to the 
amount of impairment until nullification is removed, and subject to 
authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and then as a last 
step, provides for retaliation.55  Countermeasures are generally authorized 
 48. TBT, supra note 23, art. 2.2. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See generally SCM, supra note 24. 
 51. See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 22–23 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 186, 2003) available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/ 
Working/index.html. 
 52. See MARIE WILKE, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., FEED-IN 
TARIFFS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WTO SUBSIDY RULES: AN INITIAL LEGAL REVIEW 
20 (2011) available at http://ictsd.org/i/publications/112508/?view=document. 
 53. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
art. 19, ¶ 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 54. See id. art. 22, ¶ 2. 
 55. See id. arts. 3, ¶ 7, 22. 
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in the same sector as the violation but on occasion may be authorized in 
non-related sectors.56  The WTO itself does not impose the 
countermeasures, but authorizes the plaintiff (trade-injured country) 
to impose these countermeasures themselves.57  As remedies supported 
under WTO law to re-adjust the trade rights and obligations, these 
measures are not expected to affect state liability. 
B.  International State Liability 
According to Charnovitz,58 “it was once possible to characterize the 
GATT as a self contained contractual arrangement in which the rules of 
state responsibility” did not apply.59  As Charnovitz further states, however, 
the Appellate Body, in the Reformulated Gasoline case, stated “the DSU 
reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement [on Tariffs 
and Trade] is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international 
law.”60  This leads to the conclusion that whenever the remedies authorized 
could be considered “sanctions” the issue of responsibility or liability 
does arise.61  Especially if and when countermeasures, especially as 
cross-retaliation in sectors not associated with the violation, are authorized 
to compel a state to comply with a previous “rebalancing order” (either 
to remove the offending measure or be permitted to suspend concessions 
granted) the responsibility-inducing effect of the remedy becomes more 
clear.62  This paper suggests, however, an effect beyond the effect of 
induced responsibility that can occur post WTO authorized remedial 
measures, or even without WTO remedial measures at all, by showing 
that, in the particular case where climate related energy policies are at 
stake, a country can become liable through trade effects whether or not 
trade remedies are authorized.  This is especially significant because, more 
than traditional national environmental regulations, energy policies are 
the basis of development in any country.63  Thus, such trade effects 
 56. See id. art. 22, ¶ 3(a)-(b). 
 57. See id. art. 22, ¶ 3. 
 58. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 
(2001). 
 59. Id. at 793. 
 60. Id. at 793–94. 
 61. Id. at 805. 
 62. By using “sanctions” to induce compliance with a breach of WTO rules, a 
WTO sanction can be considered a countermeasure that is taken to induce compliance 
with international obligations.  See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-
June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, art. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 
SER.A/2001/Add.1. 
 63. See supra Figure 1(a). 
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brought into global perspective as WTO disputes potentially have 
significant effects on national development as well as climate protection. 
In this paper, state liability is defined as economic or financial liability 
arising from economic or financial damage caused not by intentional or 
non-intentional breach of international obligations or unlawful act, but as 
a result of implementation, in part, of international obligations undertaken 
by the majority of countries for a greater public good, specifically, the 
obligation to minimize damage to the climate necessarily through 
national energy policies. 
III.  PAST RULINGS ON THE CONSISTENCY OF NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES WITH WTO LAW 
The DSB’s interpretation of what constitutes an environmental measure 
and its compatibility with WTO law has evolved through a series of 
environmental and natural resource cases described below. 
Starting with the Herring-Salmon case in 1988,64 the Panel held that a 
Canadian measure, adopted in part for conservation, prohibiting the 
export of salmon and herring, was inconsistent with GATT and could 
not be justified as an environmental measure because it was not 
primarily concerned with conservation or protection.65  However, in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case (1998), the AB rephrased this primary concern 
requirement with a requirement that the measure need only relate to 
conservation.66  Previously, in the Reformulated Gasoline case (1996), 
the AB had clarified that even if a measure “. . . falls within the terms of 
 64. Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, L/6268-35S/98 (Nov. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Report of the Panel, 
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon]. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 4.6 (emphasis added). 
The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not have 
to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource to be considered as ‘relating to’ conservation within the 
meaning of Article XX(g) . . . A trade measure could therefore in the view of 
the Panel only be considered to be made effective ‘in conjunction with’ 
production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these 
restrictions. 
 Id. 
 66. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
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Article XX (g) . . . ”,67 it must also be assessed for conformity with the 
conditions of the Chapeau.68  For example, by not taking into account 
whether other countries’ resource conservation policies were as effective 
as US conservation policies, or by negotiating an international sea turtle 
protection convention with Caribbean states to the exclusion of other 
shrimp importing countries, the US had arbitrarily discriminated against 
other countries.69 
The Tuna-Dolphin cases (1991, 1994) clarified other requirements for 
national environmental exceptions.70  In Tuna-Dolphin I, the US argued that 
the ban on the import of tuna caught by fleets that did not exclude 
dolphins under its Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972),71 could be 
justified by GATT Article XX (b) and (g), due to its environmental and 
 67. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated 
Gasoline AB Report]. 
 68. Id. The AB then explained how the chapeau should be applied: 
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the 
measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular 
exceptions—paragraphs (a) to (j)—listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy 
the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX.  The analysis 
is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of 
characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the 
same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX. 
   The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned 
measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that 
measure is applied.  It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose 
and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention 
of “abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX].”  This 
insight drawn from the drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The 
chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX 
may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to 
frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the 
substantive rules of the General Agreement.  If those exceptions are not to be 
abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular 
exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties 
of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties 
concerned. 
Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 69. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶¶ 163, 171. 
 70. For the U.S.-Mexico Panel Report of the dispute, see Panel Report, United 
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna 
Dolphin Panel I Report].  For the U.S.-EEC Panel Report of the dispute, see Panel 
Report, United States—Restrictions on Import of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Panel II Report].  For a summary of the series of cases related 
to this issue, see Mexico etc versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited October 1, 2012). 
 71. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407 (2006).  
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act was adopted on the basis of evidence that 
human activities were in part causing the depletion to below sustainable population 
levels of various marine mammals.  See id. § 1361(1). 
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conservation objectives.72  However, the Panel stated that if the measure 
applied extra-territorially, and if each contracting party were to apply its 
own conservation policies outside its jurisdiction, then other states’ trade 
rights would be affected.73  Thus the Panel rejected the extra-territorial 
application of Article XX (b) and (g).74 
In Tuna-Dolphin II, a US measure banned the import of processed 
tuna from countries that did not ban the import of tuna caught by a 
method that did not exclude dolphins.75  This secondary nation embargo 
was challenged by the EEC and the Netherlands.76  Consistent with its 
previous Tuna-Dolphin decision, the Panel found that a measure could 
not be distinguished on the basis of its method of production, and that a 
state had extra-territorial jurisdiction, at most, only upon its own 
nationals.77  A conservation measure applied extra-territorially would only 
work by forcing the other countries to change their policies, a violation of 
the sovereignty of states, and trade measures could not be used to protect 
domestic producers required to achieve higher environmental standards 
(and therefore only able to sell at higher prices).78  Further, the secondary 
trade embargo was considered not necessary to protect dolphins, as there 
were reasonable alternatives.79 
Though not adopted, the Tuna-Dolphin rulings’ non-distinction of a 
product on the basis of its production method can have repercussions for 
 72. See Tuna Dolphin Panel I Report, supra note 70, ¶¶ 5.24, 5.30. 
 73. Id. ¶ 5.32. 
 74. Id. ¶ 5.32. 
 75. See Tuna Dolphin Panel II Report, supra note 70, ¶ 2.12 (“[A]ny nation 
(“intermediary nation”) that exports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products to the 
United States, and that imports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products that are subject 
to a direct prohibition on import into the United States, must certify and provide 
reasonable proof that it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within 
the preceding six months.”). 
 76. Id. ¶ 3.3 (stating that “[t]he EEC and the Netherlands claimed that the 
measures taken by the United States under the intermediary nation embargo were a 
quantitative restriction of tuna and tuna products that was prima facie contrary to Article 
XI:1 of the General Agreement.”). 
 77. Id. ¶ 5.17. 
 78. See id. ¶¶ 5.26–5.27 (emphasis added). 
If however Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to take 
trade measures so as to force other contracting parties to change their policies 
within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the balance of 
rights and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of 
access to markets, would be seriously impaired. 
Id. 
 79. Id. ¶ 5.35. 
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national climate and energy policies having cross border effects.  For 
example, electricity produced by renewable energy, a potentially desirable 
outcome in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, could not be distinguished 
from electricity produced by conventional fossil fuels, and, according to 
the logic of Tuna-Dolphin I and II, could not be used to justify an 
environmental exception. In the Shrimp-Turtle case (1998), with facts 
nearly identical to the Tuna-Dolphin cases, regarding a US measure to 
conserve endangered turtles by banning the import of shrimp caught by a 
method that did not protect turtles,80  the Panel considered the ban 
measure a Product Process Measure (PPM), and thus an unpermitted 
quantitative restriction that was prima facie discriminatory.81  The AB 
reversed this interpretation, however, and stated that while all domestic 
measures, even if a PPM, were unilateral measures that tried to impose on 
others, they may still be justifiable under Article XX82 provided the measure 
then passes all the requirements of the Chapeau.83  While there is a marked 
preference for internationally negotiated solutions to regional and global 
environmental problems, as stated in this case and in the WTO rules, it 
would appear that under such narrow conditions, certain domestic 
measures, whether product related or a product production measure, related 
to, but not necessarily primarily aimed at conservation or environmental 
protection, may have extra-territorial application, and may have priority over 
international trade rights. 
The Automobile Fuel Efficiency case provides an example of what 
can happen even when a WTO panel ruling is not adopted or appealed.84  
 80. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 7.11, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp Panel 
Report]. 
 81. Id. ¶ 7.49. 
 82. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶ 187(c). 
 83. Id. ¶¶ 173–74. 
 84. Post 1994, the adoption of Panel Reports takes place automatically unless 
rejected by consensus.  The chance of rejection by consensus is basically non-existent as 
the injured state is never expected to reject.  According to the WTO website: 
One Member opposing the adoption of the report is not sufficient, nor is a 
majority; instead, what is needed to reject (or not to adopt) the panel report is a 
consensus against adoption by all Members represented at the relevant DSB 
meeting.  In other words, one single Member insisting on adoption is sufficient 
in order to secure the adoption of the report.  Normally, at least one party has 
an interest in the adoption because, overall, it prevailed with the panel.  Even if 
many panel decisions are mixed in that not all the claims of violation of 
(WTO) law succeed, there is usually a “winner” (the complainant, if at least 
one claim is upheld, and the respondent, if all are dismissed) and a “loser” in 
the formal sense.  Because the prevailing party has a natural interest in having 
the panel’s conclusions become binding upon the parties, the adoption of panel 
reports is “quasi-automatic”.  Thus, rejection by (negative) consensus is more 
theoretical than real, and has never occurred in the WTO practice to date. 
208 
 
SILVA-SEND 2/29/2016  12:07 PM 
[VOL. 4:  195, 2012-13] Climate Change Disputes at the WTO 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
This case arose from litigation against the US Corporate Average Fuel 
Efficiency (CAFE) standards under the US Energy Policy Conservation 
Act of 1975, adopted in part for national security and in part to conserve 
energy.85  The CAFE standards required the average fuel-efficiency of 
all U.S. and foreign manufactured and imported cars to not fall below a 
given level.86  Many European manufacturers met the CAFE standards in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, but later shifted to a strategy of exporting 
more profitable, less fuel-efficient luxury cars to the US, voluntarily 
choosing not to comply with the CAFE standards and, as a result, paid 
substantial penalties under the national law.87  In 1993, Europe challenged 
the CAFE standards under GATT, claiming that the standards had a 
negative impact on European manufacturers.88  The Panel upheld the 
challenge, ruling that the measure violated GATT non-discrimination 
rules, even if there was a non-discriminatory intent.89  Despite the fact 
that the ruling was neither adopted nor appealed, the main implication of 
this ruling is that if a national rule concerning energy policy for multiple 
objectives, including environmental protection, is not discriminatory in 
intent, a party that chooses not to comply with it and then suffers the 
trade consequences can claim discriminatory effect.  This could create an 
incentive for foreign firms in any country to violate national regulations 
designed at least in part to protect the environment, and then claim injury 
under the WTO.  The practical effects of this complaint on GHG mitigation 
were negative as European manufacturers chose to pay the CAFE 
penalties for 27 years, rather than comply with US environmental 
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: 
CHAPTER 6, § 6.4, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement 
_cbt_e/c6s4p1_e.htm. 
 85. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) were enacted under 
the National Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, revised by the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975, PL 94–163, 89 Stat. 871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2000)).  The 
statement and purpose of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 provides: “(4) 
to conserve energy supplies through energy conservation programs, and, where 
necessary, the regulation of certain energy uses; (5) to provide for improved energy 
efficiency of motor vehicles, major appliances, and certain other consumer products.” Id. 
 86. 49 U.S.C. § 32,902 (2007). 
 87. Auto manufacturers were subject to fines according to the CAFE Regulations. 
49 U.S.C. § 32,912 (2007). 
 88. Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Automobiles, ¶ 3.220, WT/DS31/R 
(Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Automobile Fuel Efficiency Panel Report]. 
 89. Id. ¶ 6.1. 
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standards.90  In addition, the US agency with jurisdiction to increase the 
CAFE penalty chose not to so that neither production nor import of these 
vehicles were discouraged.91  In the final analysis, the (un-adopted) 
decisions of this complaint can be considered unsatisfactory as a 
mechanism for environmental benefits, and puts into doubt the alleged 
environmental and national security goals of the regulation. 
For climate related energy policies, which may be considered 
extensions of environmental policies, the sum of the cases described 
above indicates the variety of outcomes possible at the WTO.  Recall 
that international law decisions, such as WTO DSB rulings, are not 
subject to the principle of stare decisis.92  Thus, each case with similar 
facts may be decided in unpredictable ways.  There is also a small 
chance that a Panel Report may be adopted without appeal.  On the 
other hand, the Shrimp-Turtle case seems to indicate a small opening 
for national environmental, including climate-energy, policies, to be 
justified as a GATT Article XX exception. 
IV.  OBLIGATIONS OF COUNTRIES UNDER THE                                           
CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
The main objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is to prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate.93  Canada, China, Japan and the US were original signatories 
and ratified the Convention in 1994.94  All parties, taking into account 
their common but differentiated responsibilities, and national development 
 90. By November 2010, European auto manufacturers had paid $794,921,139.50 
in penalties since 1983. See Summary of CAFE Fines Collected, Nat’l Highway Traffic 
Safety Admin. (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/ 
CAFE_fines_collected_summary.pdf.  Only in 2009, after paying fines for over 10 years, 
did the largest of EU CAFE standard violators, Mercedes-Benz, Inc., announce that it 
would now introduce models that would comply with the regulations and avoid the large 
fines they had been paying as well as in anticipation of future more drastic MPG 
standards in the USA. John O’Dell, Mercedes Says Its Annual CAFE Fines Are a Thing 
of the Past, AUTOOBSERVER.COM (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.autoobserver.com//2010/03/ 
mercedes-says-its-annual-cafe-fines-are-a-thing-of-the-past.html. 
 91. The original penalty was $50 per vehicle for every 1 mpg shortfall.  This was 
raised to $55 in 1997 with no changes since. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-07-921, VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY: REFORMING FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS COULD 
HELP REDUCE OIL CONSUMPTION BY CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, AND OTHER OPTIONS 
COULD COMPLEMENT THESE STANDARDS (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/products/GAO-07-921. 
 92. Guillaume, supra note 9, at 14. 
 93. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 94. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/ 
status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
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priorities, must inventory their anthropogenic emissions and sinks using 
agreed upon best scientific methods, and formulate and implement 
programs to mitigate climate change.95  The Annex I parties96 have 
committed to adopting national policies to limit anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and protect and enhance GHG sinks.97  Annex I parties must 
aim to return to 1990 levels.98  This is the most explicit substantive 
commitment beyond the obligations for all parties.99  Developing countries’ 
(non-Annex I) implementation of obligations depends on the Annex I 
parties’ commitment to finance and transfer technology.100 
All parties must therefore implement climate change mitigation 
policies as well as be guided by the principle that there be a “supportive 
and open international economic system[,]” and that measures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”101  This provision harmonizes the UNFCCC with 
the non-discrimination principles of the WTO.  But how this provision 
works in practice, with the very different substantive requirements 
undertaken by each country to reduce traditional energy use and GHGs, 
is far from obvious and clearly needs to be developed.  All countries 
must take unilateral action under the UNFCCC, which can have a de facto 
discriminatory effect on trade, as will be seen below.  The UNFCCC 
itself does not address the effects of non-compliance, although the preamble 
refers to the no-harm principle.102 
The Kyoto Protocol103 further requires Annex I states to “. . . 
individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A 
do not exceed their assigned amounts given in Annex B . . . with a view 
to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent 
 95. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 4(1), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 96. The Annex I parties are all the EU countries, Australia, Belarus, Canada, 
Croatia, the European Economic Community, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. UNFCCC, supra note 93, annex I. 
 97. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 4(2). 
 98. Id. art. 4(2)(b). 
 99. Id. 
 100. UNFCCC, supra note 93, art. 4(3). 
 101. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 3(5). 
 102. See UNFCCC, supra note 93, pmbl., § 8. 
 103. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95. 
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below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”104  Under 
this scheme, Japan has committed to a 6% reduction of greenhouse gases 
below 1990 levels, and Canada to an average 6% decrease below 1990 
levels.105  The US as an original signatory but not a member of the Kyoto 
Protocol has not taken on specific quantitative reduction targets.106  
China, a non-Annex I party, was an original signatory and ratified the 
Protocol, with concurrent obligations for non-Annex I parties. 107 
To meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I parties 
must implement measures listed non-exhaustively in Article 2, such as: 
“(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national 
economy; (iv) . . . promotion, development and increased use of, new 
and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration 
technologies . . . ; and (vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases . . . in the transport sector.”108  All parties must 
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, 
where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate 
climate change . . . “where “[s]uch programmes would, inter alia, 
concern the energy, transport and industry sectors as well as agriculture, 
forestry and waste management.”109 
Therefore, with or without the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
climate regime requires that all member states adopt measures on energy 
efficiency and alternative energy as principle measures to mitigate climate 
change.  These measures affect nearly all sectors of the local, regional, 
national and global economy.110  For example, China, as a non-Annex I 
state, while it does not commit to quantifiable GHG reductions by 2012, 
or aim to achieve 1990 levels at some unspecified date, is nonetheless 
obliged to formulate and implement climate change mitigation measures 
concerning energy, transport and industry, among others.  The obligations 
of China under the climate regime appear to be somewhat less onerous, 
and largely in terms of procedural requirements, than those of the US.  
The US, as only an Annex I UNFCCC member, must “only” aim to 
achieve 1990 levels by an unspecified date.  The practical difference 
 104. Id. art. 4(2)(b). 
 105. Kyoto Protocol Targets, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Oct. 17, 
2011). 
 106. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/ 
items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, art. 2(1)(a). 
 109. Id. art. 10. 
 110. As energy and GDP are closely related.  Merchandise Trade, supra note 14; 
see also supra Figure 1(a). 
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between “aim to achieve 1990 levels” and “must adopt measures to 
mitigate” is arguably negligible.  In effect, the substantive international 
climate change obligations for the US, as an Annex I party, and China as 
a non-Annex I party, appear to be similar. 
The UNFCCC has no provision or mechanism to address the benefits 
of the consequences of countries’ climate-related energy policies with 
trade and development goals.111 For all countries, a lower carbon future 
requires switching from fossil fuel sources to less carbon intense energy 
sources.  Additionally, becoming more energy efficient requires increasing 
the energy efficiency of goods and services.  To happen quickly, both of 
these major developmental changes require large investment.  The general 
practices for these purposes are government intervention through financial 
mechanisms such as subsidies,112 as well as command and control 
mechanisms such as energy efficiency standards for goods.  But what 
happens when some states create standards for globally traded products 
that are significantly more energy efficient than others?  Must all other 
countries producing equivalent goods reach the same energy efficiency 
standards or might those states that are producing more energy efficient 
goods be forced to lower those standards due to the potentially negative 
effects on global trade?  In other words, what is the effect on global 
trade when countries that are not obliged to do so under the international 
climate change regime subsidize clean energy industries or may even be 
permitted to raise their levels of energy use and emissions?113  Can such 
countries’ energy policies flood the global market with cheaper clean 
energy goods—an environmentally desirable situation—and become 
internationally liable for the effects on the global trading system? 
V.  UNRESOLVED NATIONAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
COMPLAINTS AT THE WTO AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The potential effects of WTO resolution of climate related energy 
policies can be illustrated through analysis of three existing unresolved 
complaints.  The Greenhouse Gas Controversy is an older energy policy 
 111. The only provision relating climate policies and international trade is a non-
discrimination provision.  See UNFCCC, supra note 93. 
 112. The Global Revival of Industrial Policy: Picking Winners, Saving losers, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16741043. 
 113. Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol provides member states’ allowable emissions. 
Iceland, for example, was permitted to raise its emissions within the compliance period 
by 10 %. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 95, annex B. 
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based complaint114 that provides a useful example to assess what the 
outcomes may look like should it be re-activated or similar complaints 
arise.  In 1999, the EU and the US (acting on behalf of Ford and 
Daimler-Chrysler) threatened WTO action against the Japan’s Top 
Runner Program adopted under its 1979 Law for the Rational Use of 
Energy, and revised in main part to fulfill Japan’s Kyoto Protocol 
obligations.115  The Top Runner Program established energy efficiency 
standards for a variety of products, including medium-weight automobiles, 
and has been proven to be the most effective globally to meet the multiple 
objectives of reduction of fuel imports, climate change mitigation and 
cost effectiveness.116  Thus, Mitsubishi Motors produced the most fuel 
efficient and lowest GHG emitting cars, whereas 90% of the medium-
weight imports were of EU/US origin, which would have to reach the 
efficiency standards met by Mitsubishi by a given date or face penalties.117  
The EU/US complained that this measure was unnecessarily trade-
restrictive under the TBT.118 
A second complaint was received in September 2010 when Japan 
requested consultations with Canada119 regarding Ontario’s measures 
relating to domestic content requirements in the Feed-in Tariff Program 
(FIT Program).  Japan has claimed that the measures are inconsistent 
with Canada’s obligations under GATT Article III because “they appear 
to be laws, regulations or requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of equipment for 
renewable energy generation facilities that accord less favorable treatment 
to imported equipment than the treatment accorded to like products 
originating in Ontario.”120  Japan also alleges the measures could be internal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of a 
specified amount or proportion of equipment for renewable energy 
 114. Peter Constantini, What’s Wrong With the WTO? WTO Controversies, 
SPEAKEASY.ORG (Nov. 2001), http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wtow/wto-cont.htm. 
 115. Act Concerning the Rational Use of Energy, Act No. 49 of 1979, art. 1–3 
(Japan). 
 116. In recognition of the effectiveness of this program, Germany’s new 2011 
energy strategy will seek to emulate that for products in Germany. Der Weg zur Energie 
der Zukunf –sicher, bezahlbar und umweltfreundlich, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR 
WIRTSCHAFT UND TECHNOLOGIE, http://www.bmu.de/energiewende/doc/47465.php (last 
updated June 6, 2011). 
 117. Constantini, supra note 114. 
 118. Bruce Barnard, European Carmakers to Challenge Japan at WTO, THE 
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Dec. 21, 1998, 7:00 PM), http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/ 
european-carmakers-challenge-japan-wto_19981221.html. 
 119. Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-in-Tariff Program, World Trade 
Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 120. Id. 
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generation facilities, be supplied from Ontario sources.121  Japan argues 
that this affords protection to Ontario production of such equipment, 
contrary to the non- discrimination principles of GATT.122  Japan has 
further alleged that the measure is a prohibited subsidy as a financial 
contribution or a form of income or price support, and a benefit is 
thereby conferred that appears to be provided “contingent . . . upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods” under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of 
the SCM Agreement.123 
A third complaint was brought in December 2010 by the US against 
Chinese wind energy subsidies based on a petition by the United 
Steelworkers to the US government for WTO action.124  This complaint 
alleged that actionable subsidies in China125 to promote their domestic 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. As of August 2011, the European Union has also requested consultation with 
Canada on Measures Relating to the Feed-in-Tariff program. Id. 
 124. See United Steelworkers’ Section 301 Petition Demonstrates China’s Green 
Technology Practices Violate WTO Rules, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://assets.usw. 
org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Steelworkers’ 
Complaint] (only the Executive Summary of the reported 5,800 page long United 
Steelworkers 301 Petition is available).  Based on the Petition, the United States Office 
of the Trade Representative launched an investigation on October 15, 2010 that ended in 
December 22, 2011 with the complaint submitted to the WTO. See United States 
Launches Section 301 Investigation into China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment 
in Green Technologies, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 
2012), http://www.ustr.gov/node/6227. 
 125. China adopted its national energy and climate strategy as part of its 12th Five 
Year Plan on March 2011 with targets to reduce energy intensity (16% reduction by 
2015 of 2005 level, 40-45% by 2020) and CO2 emissions per unit GDP (17% reduction 
by 2015).  In its 2009 Renewable Energy Law, which took effect in April 2010, China 
authorized feed-in tariffs for on-shore wind based on geographical wind distribution, and 
biomass and set a target of 100 Gigawatts of wind power capacity by 2020.  The lowest 
wind tariff is RMB0.51/kWh (7.5 US cents/kWh) for the best wind resources of Inner 
Mongolia and parts of Xinjiang.  The rates decrease to RMB0.54/kWh (7.9 US 
cents/kWh), RMB0.58/kWh (8.5 US cents/kWh) and RMB0.61/kWh (9.0 US cents/kWh 
with decreasing wind strength).  The tariff for biomass now is RMB0.35/kWh (5.2 US 
cents/kWh).  In 2006, China increased to 15% the target share of renewables, including 
nuclear, in its final energy consumption, up from the previous 8% target.  See Deborah 
Seligsohn & Angel Hsu, China Releases 12th Five Year Plan, SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS, 
http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/22006 (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2011); see also Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peoples Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 
1, 2006), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. Issue 11, Serial No. 1154 (China), translated at 
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=5371 [hereinafter REL 2006], 
amended by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Renewable Energy 
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renewable energy industry have injured the US steel industry and 
associated industries by displacing US wind industry component exports 
to China by 67%–81% and to the EU by 30%.126  For solar cells and 
panels, such subsidies are alleged to have caused the global price to drop 
by 40%, China to achieve 34% market share in the EU, displacing the 
US share of exports to the EU to 3.7%.127  Moreover, the subsidies are 
alleged to have caused US panel makers to shift production to China in 
2009 and 2010, leading to national economic losses.128 
A.  Potential Solutions, Signals for National Energy Policies and 
International Liability 
How may these complaints be resolved at the WTO and what signals 
do they send for national climate related energy policies?  Applying the 
reasoning of the Automobile Fuel-Efficiency Case to the GHG 
Controversy for example, the DSB could find that the measure, despite 
its probable motive to protect the climate, or its likely non-discriminatory 
intent, has negative trade consequences, or is in effect discriminatory, 
specifically towards EU auto manufacturers, and thus fails GATT Article 
XX tests.  Alternatively, or in addition, the measure may be found un-
necessarily trade restrictive under the TBT.  The measure may need to 
be withdrawn, made less stringent in terms of emissions standards, or 
applied differently.129  If Japan were to withdraw or lower its energy 
efficiency standards, the EU, through the WTO, would be forcing Japan 
to change its climate protective energy policies.  A second possible 
outcome for an un-necessarily trade restrictive measure under the TBT 
would be for Japan to cooperate with the EU and US importers, assisting 
them to achieve compliance.130  This is costly and time consuming for 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26,2009, effective Apr. 
1, 2010), 2009 China Law LEXIS 671 (China) [hereinafter Amended REL 2009]; see 
also Eric Martinot & Li Junfeng, Renewable Energy Policy Update for China, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-update-for-china. 
 126. See Matthew L. Wald & Keith Bradsher, 4 U.S. Makers of Towers for Wind 
Turbines File Complaint Over China’s Steel Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at 
B2. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 66, ¶¶ 172, 186 (countries must respect the 
rights of other member states and seek to consult and negotiate a regional or international 
solution to transboundary environmental issues). 
 130. Id. ¶ 168. Under this interpretation, Japan would most likely have to seriously 
seek to negotiate international technical standards, or seek to harmonize their national 
technical standards with those of other countries. 
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Japan, making Japan indirectly liable for its stronger climate related 
energy policies. 
Alternatively, if the measure could be considered more trade 
restrictive than necessary, a different outcome would be for Japan to 
ignore the ruling and pay fines to the EU and US as countermeasures 
authorized to the latter by the WTO.131  Japan would become liable in 
effect for international trade effects of its leading climate mitigation 
regulations and again, a negative signal would be sent to climate 
mitigating national energy policies worldwide. 
In yet another possible outcome, Japan’s Top Runner efficiency 
standards would be permitted to stand under international trade law.  
Unless the EU/US met the standards within a given period of time, Japan 
could either use domestic sanctions against the imports, or request sanctions 
through the WTO countermeasure systems.  Domestic sanctions over 
many years, even if self-inflicted, do not necessarily lead to climate 
mitigation.132  The EU/US, through trade losses and costs of meeting 
higher environmental standards that in this case, the US did not sign up 
for, may be forced to change their energy policies to meet higher 
environmental standards.  Meanwhile, Japan’s ability to meet its 
international Kyoto obligations would be restricted. Therefore, regardless of 
the ability of national energy policies to promote climate mitigation, the 
DSB would have the power to change the direction of either parties’ 
national energy policies. 
With no direct DSB guidance on the consistency of national subsidies 
to promote environmentally protective measures, the potential outcomes 
for resolution of the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and the Subsidies for Wind 
complaints are more speculative than for the GHG controversy based on 
(energy efficiency) standards which clearly fall under the TBT or GATT.  If 
the Feed-In Tariffs are shown contingent on local content requirements 
as alleged by Japan, this requirement for domestic content would be 
sufficient to make at least parts of the FIT prohibited, if not the whole 
FIT program, under the SCM.  On the other hand, the FIT is labeled as a 
program for government procurement and may fall outside of the SCM 
altogether.  Note that Japan is not complaining about the FIT program as 
a whole.  But establishing the existence of actionable subsidies in the 
wind complaint is even more problematic under the narrower definition 
 131. See supra pp. 211–12. 
 132. See Reformulated Gasoline AB Report, supra note 67, at 21. 
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of subsidies in the SCM.  The subsidies must be shown to be 
contributions by government to specific industries.  Such contributions 
would be actionable upon proof that either adverse effects or serious 
harm is caused to the trading partner’s interests.  Thus, the Steelworkers 
Union has alleged that adverse effects and serious harm was caused to 
the US wind and solar industry as well as depressed prices worldwide.  
The WTO DSB may consider whether this harm is sufficiently serious 
against the arguably environmentally desirable outcome that the 
widespread use of low carbon energy the subsidies would cause.  The 
DSB may also attempt to balance a national energy policy implemented 
largely for the development of a nascent Chinese industry, with large 
global environmental co-benefits, and at least partly adopted to meet 
UNFCCC obligations, against discriminatory behavior towards trading 
partners. 
Where subsidies are found to seriously injure or have adverse effects 
on other members, their adverse effects must be removed within a 
specified time.  There are examples where both prohibited subsidies and 
actionable subsidies have nonetheless been maintained, leading to large 
sanctions through countermeasures.  For example, in the Foreign Sales 
Corporation (FSC) case,133 the US faced $4.3 billion in suspended tariff 
concessions and other WTO obligations to the EU for failure to comply 
with repeated AB decisions on prohibited subsidies (no taxes on exports 
of US companies into the US).  In the Upland Cotton case, which 
spanned a period from 2002 to 2009, prohibited actionable subsidies on 
cotton in the US that made cotton exceptionally cheap on the global 
market and hurt Brazilian cotton producers, which were authorized 
$294.7 million in concessions as well as additional TRIPS rights 
suspensions worth more than $800 million.134  In August 2010, Brazil and 
the US concluded an agreement in return for not imposing countermeasures 
in the Upland Cotton case.135  These cases are indicative of situations 
where the countermeasures and substantial fines are tolerated by the 
violating state for subsidies.  If such an approach were maintained by 
China in the wind subsidies case, or Canada in the FIT case, we have a 
situation not unlike the Automobile Fuel Efficiency case, where fines are 
paid for trade violations, without environmental, climate and energy 
 133. United States–Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
 134. See United States–Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last updated Sept. 
21, 2010). 
 135. Id. 
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resource benefits and possibly defeating the climate related policy goals 
of national law. 
The wind energy subsidies complaint was preliminarily resolved in 
June 2011 at the consultation stage when China withdrew the controversial 
measure.136  But not without repercussions: other US renewable energy 
manufacturers have filed similar complaints with the US Department of 
Commerce and the US International Trade Commission against Chinese 
wind energy companies alleging subsidies leading to dumping prices.  
These complaints can lead to similar new complaints by the US against 
China at the WTO.137  In response to the uncertainty of how these 
complaints will be handled, a Chinese solar energy company is reported 
to have frozen solar installations in the US worth $500 million, affecting 
US solar installers and developers who benefit from cheaper panels.138 
As a matter of procedure, this SCM case based on allegations of 
prohibited subsidies would be processed faster than the Feed-In Tariff 
complaint related to actionable subsidies.  The SCM provides for longer 
time for reporting, appeal, and potential arbitration of actionable subsidies 
than for prohibited subsidies.139  While this time lag could be a good thing 
for climate benefits, especially in rapidly developing countries highly 
dependent on petroleum, countries harmed in trade, in this case the US, 
would have to contend with future trade losses unless the Chinese 
provisions were removed. 
It is ironic that, as stated in the US Steelworkers complaint, “From 
2008 to 2009, U.S. demand for solar power grew by a healthy 41% . . .”140  
This was likely due at least in part to the reported growth during this 
time in low cost Chinese solar panels.141  From a climate change mitigation 
perspective, a desirable scenario would be for low cost Chinese renewable 
energy products to lead to a large uptake worldwide of renewable energy.  
This would more rapidly promote the global conversion to a low carbon 
 136. China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States 
in WTO Dispute, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www. 
ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment- 
subsidies-challenged (last updated June 2011). 
 137. Wald & Bradsher, supra note 126. 
 138. Paul Jones, Chinese Solar Company Freezes Installations, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, 
Nov. 9, 2011, at 7. 
 139. SCM, supra note 26, art. 4.9. 
 140. See U.S. Steelworkers Complaint, supra note 124. 
 141. The complaint notes that panel imports from China nearly doubled in this 
period.  Id. 
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economy.  It can be argued that such WTO complaints by one or more 
affected countries could be inducing China to breach globally desirable 
substantive UNFCCC obligations, the very obligations China, and other 
developing countries like China, have been accused of not having to 
meet.142  Another possible outcome is that even the complaining state’s 
uptake of cheaper alternative energy resources may be jeopardized in 
favor of more expensive local products.  However, even without specific 
obligations under the UNFCCC regime, most countries, whether developed 
or developing, large or small, have specific or general commitments under 
the climate change regime.143  These countries look to each other for best 
practices that promote energy efficiency and the movement towards a 
globally lower carbon economy.144  They also employ similar policy and 
regulatory mechanisms, sometimes in conjunctions with local content 
rules, such as renewable energy targets, financial incentives, technical 
efficiency standards, carbon taxes.145  Such national measures that affect 
international trade may cause harm to the development and trading 
 142. See generally, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM., 110TH CONG., 
CLIMATE CHANGE LEGIS. DESIGN WHITE PAPER: COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNING ENGAGING 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–2 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/ 
southeast/climate/policy/Climate%20Dingell%202nd%20White%0Paper%20Competitiv 
eness%20013108.pdf. 
 143. See generally supra p. 19. 
 144. A widely used policy for rapidly increasing the uptake of renewable energy 
share is the feed-in-tariff.  Starting in the European Union, especially Germany’s successful 
deployment, renewable energy is being touted globally and copied.  See Ashley Seager, 
Germany Sets Shining Example in Providing a Harvest for the World, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 23, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jul/23/germany.greenbusiness. 
 145. For example, India and the Ukraine have promulgated potentially prohibited 
and actionable subsidies.  For India, see Gov’t of India, Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Towards Building SOLAR INDIA, 
MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, 3, http://www.mnre.gov.in/file-manager/ 
UserFiles/mission_document_JNNSM.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).  India, with a 
potentially very large solar energy market, has promulgated a law that solar modules 
must be produced in India to gain FIT under the JNNSM. Abhishek Shah, Solar Energy 
Protectionism–Italy Joins India, Canada in Formulating Domestic Content Requirements, 
GREEN WORLD INVESTOR (May 10, 2011), http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/ 
05/10/solar-energy-protectionism-italy-joins-indiacanada-in-formulating-domestic- 
content-requirements/.  This law is also expected to become stricter with future solar 
cells produced in the country, drawing protest from the US, which has itself faced protest 
for minimal domestic content rules in subsidies under the ARRA.  See David T. Ralston, 
Jr. & Jeffrey R. Blease, “Buy American” Provision in Stimulus Legislation Poses Serious 
Compliance Challenges for Public Works Contractors and DHS Suppliers, FOLEY & 
LARDNER LLP (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.foley.com/buy-american-provision-in-stimulus- 
legislation-poses-serious-compliance-challenges-for-public-works-contractors-and-dhs- 
suppliers-02-17-2009/.  Ukraine became the latest country to include local content 
requirements for feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy projects increasing domestic 
content requirements over time.  See Ukraine Stimulates Usage of Alternative Energy 
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interests of other states even without participation in the Kyoto Protocol, 
as shown by the US complaints,146 or with stellar participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol, as shown by the complaint against Japan.147  In the case 
of China, signals are sent that promoting low carbon alternative energy 
is not desirable in terms of international trade, and that China can become 
indirectly liable for just those policies, even when environmentally 
desirable.  In the case of Japan, the most energy efficient products could 
be shown to be similarly undesirable when traded globally, and Japan 
may become liable for trading environmentally desirable goods.  Canada, 
by restricting international trade competition that is favorable to climate 
protection, must now face potential international trade liability at the 
WTO. Finally, the US, while pushing for environmentally desirable 
outcomes in cases like Tuna-Dolphin, Shrimp Turtle, or Automobile Fuel, 
must now decide what signals it wants for itself in terms of international 
trade (non) liability by potentially resulting in fewer environmentally 
desirable goods in the global market, but at the same time potentially 
facing much greater responsibility in the future by contributing further 
and decreasing the global potential to change to a lower carbon world. 
Thus for all countries, participation in the WTO with implementation 
of climate-energy policies becomes the basis for: (1) disputes that must 
be resolved by balancing global climate concerns and international trade 
law rights and duties; (2) resolution of disputes that signal the direction of 
national climate-related energy policies; (3) state liability through trade 
remedial measures; and (4) potentially longer-term state responsibility 
for climate damage. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In 2008 one observer wrote, “[i]n particular, with a US climate policy 
in place, goods from countries without mandatory carbon restrictions—
such as China, Brazil or India—may gain a price advantage over US 
goods. It is exactly this asymmetry that led the US Senate to reject the 
 146. E.g., Ben Lefebvre, EU Tariffs on US Biodiesel Spark Debate, ICIS.COM (Apr. 
22, 2009), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/04/22/9209905/eu-tariffs-on-us-biodiesel-
spark-debate.html (describing how the European Union applied antidumping duties in 
2009 to U.S. biodiesel in reaction to subsidies for U.S. biofuel producers, which caused 
the price of U.S biofuel to undercut European produced biofuel); see also Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (providing subsidies for U.S producers of 
biofuels). 
 147. See generally Constantini, supra note 114. 
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Kyoto Protocol.  The competitiveness impact of US climate policy may 
play out both at home (on the US market) and abroad (on world 
markets).”148  However, contrary to this observer’s assumption that the 
basis would be that the US has mandatory climate restrictions, and 
China does not, has not turned out to be the case.  The main argument 
for US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol, or similar obligations in 
the future, becomes moot, as China, the largest developing country, has 
also adopted national climate-related energy strategies.  With China 
entering the global renewable energy market in an aggressive way, Japan 
at the forefront of energy efficiency goods, or other developed countries 
taking protective local measures to develop their own nascent renewable 
energy sectors, a competitive trading situation has arisen globally that 
has sparked controversies at the WTO. 
Though not excluding the possibility that climate change litigation 
will arise through other international fora, this paper has shown that the 
WTO has become a significant international venue to channel complaints 
related to national climate-related energy regulations.  The WTO thus 
faces a challenging opportunity to grapple with and balance the  national 
regulation of climate change and international trade.  Past DSB rulings 
on environment and trade can have differing and inconsistent outcomes.  
Similar inconsistencies are possible in cases related to climate change, 
such as the greenhouse gas controversy (Japan/EU/US), the feed-in tariffs 
complaint (Japan/Canada), and the wind subsidies complaint (US/China). 
Depending on the outcome, countries may not have a trade advantage if 
they promote energy policies based even partly on climate mitigation.  In 
addition the complainant or defendant could become liable for climate 
change, either directly or indirectly, through WTO countermeasures, 
national enforcement and penalties, or WTO authorized compensation.  
Whether a party, or both parties, become indirectly liable for their 
climate-related energy policies depends on whether the national energy 
conserving or climate measure can be considered a GATT Article XX 
exception, a TBT Article 2.2 exception, or it requires the complex task 
of deciding on the acceptability of SCM subsidies under WTO law. To 
note is that a complaining party need not have a direct legal interest to 
bring a case to the WTO.  If a member’s behavior could be shown to 
affect another member’s rights, any member affected by a measure 
would have a similar right to fight the measure.149 
 148. Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: 
The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 2 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy 
Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007) (emphasis removed). 
 149. Andrea Bianchi & Lorenzo Gradoni, Developing Countries, Countermeasures 
and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law, 
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The WTO has shown a willingness to attempt to balance trade and 
environmental issues on a case-by-case basis and has the power to 
mandate the direction of climate-related energy policy.  Where a case 
involves large energy consumers, such as the US or China, a WTO 
decision can have significant global environmental effects.  The WTO 
has become a significant forum to achieve some progress where 
international climate change negotiations have not.  Although WTO 
provisions and the DSB lend strong support for the preferential 
development of global solutions, the DSB cannot wait for long-term 
negotiated solutions when faced with immediate international trade 
complaints based on national climate-related energy policies.  At the 
same time, the WTO has no prescribed mechanism to weigh the effects 
of its decisions on a countries’ energy and climate policies, nor a duty to 
observe precedent in their jurisprudence.  Therefore, lacking negotiated 
solutions to global energy and climate change issues, the effect of the 
WTO’s decisions on national climate mitigating energy policies, 
associated effects on global climate change mitigation, liability through 
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